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The Contribution of Hugo Chávez to an
Understanding of Post-Neoliberalism
by
Anthony Petros Spanakos and Dimitris Pantoulas
When Hugo Chávez was president, he pronounced the death of many things—the
constitution, the old “partyarchy,” Venezuela’s “Fourth Republic,” and the Free Trade
Area of the Americas, among others. Since his own death in 2013, scholars, activists, and
citizens have contributed to a rich discussion of his legacy. Part of that legacy is an understanding of post-neoliberalism that recognizes its competing and contradictory components, some of them seeking to complement, improve, and reverse neoliberal policies or
overcome neoliberal logics and others constituting important remnants of neoliberalism.
Durante su presidencia, Hugo Chávez declaró la muerte de muchas cosas: la constitución, el viejo “partiarcado,” la Cuarta República de Venezuela y el Tratado de Libre
Comercio de las Américas, entre otros. Desde su muerte en 2013, un grupo variado de
estudiosos, activistas y ciudadanos ha llevado a cabo una rica discusión sobre su legado.
Una parte importante de su legado es el entender que el post-neoliberalismo tiene componentes contrapuestos y contradictorios, y reconocer que algunos de ellos buscan complementar, mejorar y revertir las políticas neoliberales o superar la lógica neoliberal y otros
importantes vestigios constituyentes del neoliberalismo.
Keywords: Neoliberalism, Post-neoliberalism, Citizenship, Chávez, Venezuela

When he was first sworn into office in 1999, Venezuelan President Hugo
Chávez swore on the “moribund constitution” that Venezuela would be reborn
through a new constitution (Krauss, 1999). In the 14 years in which he was
president, he pronounced the death of many things—the constitution of 1961,
the old “partyarchy,” Venezuela’s “Fourth Republic,” and the Free Trade Area
of the Americas, among others. Since his own death in 2013, scholars, activists,
and citizens have contributed to a rich discussion of his legacy. This essay offers
a contribution to this dialogue by considering one of Chávez’s favorite subjects,
neoliberalism, through the prism of Venezuelan politics in the past two decades.
Given the vitriol with which Chávez attacked neoliberalism, one might expect
a fairly straightforward legacy for the former president on this issue,1 but neither
he nor neoliberalism is susceptible to simplistic analysis. Indeed, the rise of Latin
America’s left—of which Chávez was a very important figure—demonstrates
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consensus on the value of post-neoliberalism and considerable disagreement
about what it should look like.
Understanding post-neoliberalism to be an open and contested semantic terrain that—along with neoliberalism—has more rhetorical than analytical value,
this essay highlights four overlapping spaces within post-neoliberalism. Postneoliberalism may be “post-“ in that it (1) follows neoliberalism temporally and
attempts to correct and/or broaden it, (2) aims to go beyond neoliberalism in
the way it conceives of politics and the state, (3) seeks to create an utterly new
ontological and/or ideological project, and (4) includes spaces where neoliberalism remains significant if not dominant. This typology attempts to characterize the ideas, words, and actions of post-neoliberal political actors across Latin
America, giving priority to the distinct ways in which such actors have positioned themselves (Schaffer, 1998).
What is neoliberalism/post-neoliberalism?
Harvey’s (2005) critique of neoliberalism invites scholars to consider problematics within it. The apparent crisis of neoliberalism in the developed world
seems to draw on political contestation that may have first emerged in Latin
America (see Coronil, 2011). Most examinations of the initial scholarship on the
subject focus on the rise of the new left and what it has done in power (Ellner,
2012), although there is increasing attention to questions of “post-neoliberalism” (Arditi, 2008; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012; Yates and Bakker, 2013).
“Post-neoliberalism” is no easy thing to define. Panizza (2009) discusses the
various ideas, actors, and structures that contributed to a post–Washington
Consensus but avoids defining it. In studying the contentious politics that
sought to arrest and correct trends toward the commodification of land, labor,
and capital, Silva (2009) avoids defining not only post-neoliberalism but neoliberalism itself. Coronil’s (2011) essay linking the 2008 financial crisis and the
possible futures of the Latin American left defines neoliberalism only by its
outcomes (a shrunken welfare state, greater inequality, more social polarization). If there is a post-neoliberalism for Coronil, it is some mixture of clarity
about the need to be anti-neoliberal and ambiguity about the direction in which
society should move (see also Lomnitz, 2006). Peck, Theodore, and Brenner
(2012) are uncomfortable speaking of post-neoliberalism, preferring to study
“neoliberalization,” which is unevenly distributed spatially and assumes
hybrid forms.
Thus, there are many reasons to avoid defining post-neoliberalism, the most
obvious being the difficulty of defining neoliberalism. Boas and Gans-Morse
(2009) reviewed 148 journals discussing neoliberalism published between 1990
and 2004 and found that almost 70 percent did not even give a summary definition of neoliberalism. Beyond this, they found that the term was unevenly used
in the literature and generally applied to many different phenomena (policies
of economic reform, a holistic development model, an ideology, or even an
academic paradigm).
The problem of definition is endemic in the social sciences, where most key
concepts are “fuzzy” (Schmitter, 2009). Democracy, neoliberalism, populism,
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and legitimacy, among other terms, are regularly invoked by scholars and
political actors in multiform ways. This leaves scholars with two possibilities:
crafting a concept with as few components as possible to eliminate ambiguity
(Schedler, 2010) and recognizing that the inconsistency in the concept is fundamental to its capacity to represent real-world phenomena and motivate political action (Freeden, 2004). This essay takes the latter approach, giving preference
to the multiple ways actors have used differing elements of the concept of postneoliberalism in their communication and action.
Like other key political concepts, “neoliberalism” seldom exists in its pure
form but coexists with other discourses embedded in economic and political
institutions. It should therefore be conceived not as a closed totality of ideas
diffused across nations and through time but rather as “a loosely connected set
of concepts, distinctions and arguments that gained meaning as they were
articulated and then stabilized in specific ways, depending on the particular
discursive and political contexts in which this occurred” (Panizza, 2009: 9). It
has been both a utopian project with a grand vision and a practical piecemeal
political process. This is why it is so important to contextualize neoliberalism
and post-neoliberalism. Indeed, Panizza’s preference is to think of neoliberalism not only as a set of policies but as “an ideational frame . . . in a loose set of
beliefs associated with laissez-faire capitalism.”
Challenges to neoliberalism that claim to be post- and/or anti-neoliberal
share certain characteristics even though they channel protests through locally
meaningful modes and institutions and use discourses of rebellion appropriate
to the subnational and national issues at stake (Ellner, 2012; Silva, 2009). Often
using language that claims to be socialist, they are characterized as neostructuralist and extractivist (Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes, 2013), anti-neoliberal but
still capitalist (French, 2009).
Grugel and Riggirozzi (2012) find that the term “post-neoliberalism” is most
meaningful in terms of understanding changes in the way citizenship is conceived—the deepening of democracy and the socialization of citizen-market
relations. Yates and Bakker (2013) offer an excellent ground-up analysis of postneoliberalism in Latin America. This essay departs from theirs in a few important ways. First, whereas for Yates and Bakker post-neoliberalism is a rejection
of neoliberalism, we argue that “inclusive neoliberalism” (the effort to improve
it) is part of post-neoliberalism and that excluding it would disqualify the
demands and changes in Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil and perhaps elsewhere.
Second, whereas Yates and Bakker recognize that neoliberalism persists, they
do not include it in post-neoliberalism, but we suggest that it continues to offer
meaningful logics to various actors despite their operating in a “post”-neoliberal environment. Yates and Bakker recognize this in their reading of Brazil
under the Workers’ Party (see also Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes, 2013), but their
conceptualization of post-neoliberalism does not allow for such potentially
contradictory tensions. For Bebbington and Bebbington (2011), many “postneoliberal” governments continue to exercise neoliberal policies in the extraction of natural resources and therefore cannot truly be so called.
Grugel and Riggirozzi and Yates and Bakker focus on new state-societymarket relations that aim at a more social economy and a greater role for
the state and local political groups in defining democracy. This is indeed
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fundamental, but it does not distinguish traditional state-driven efforts (often
funded by extraction and/or high commodity prices) to empower citizens and
encourage participatory innovation in the present political institutional framework from more ambitious efforts to rethink political ontologies. Yates and
Bakker hint at such a distinction when they confess that sumak kawsay (living
well) is not entirely anti-neoliberal, but they do not believe that it constitutes an
additional category within post-neoliberalism. We do.
In the new typology we propose, “post-neoliberalism” may, first, be “post-”
in that it follows neoliberalism temporally and, with differing levels of awareness and incisiveness, recognizes the strengths and weaknesses of neoliberalinspired policies and aims to complement and correct them. It sees neoliberalism
as incomplete and in need of either a second or a third generation of reforms
(Krueger, 2000) or an extension of benefits to a broader class of beneficiaries
(Stallings and Peres, 2000). It recognizes the value of the price stability and the
improved export profile brought by neoliberalism but aims to correct its economic concentration, trade imbalances, and capital account vulnerabilities
(Ocampo, 2011). This post-neoliberalism softens the rougher edges of neoliberal policies in an effort to institutionalize its administrative mechanisms.
Overall, it aims to maintain price stability while encouraging growth and
reducing macro- and microeconomic vulnerabilities. It relies on a notion of
politics as administration that favors expertise and a continued distinction
between government and citizens.2 This approach is associated with readings
of Chile’s Concertación governments (Castañeda, 2006; Navia, 2010).
Second, “post-neoliberalism” may refer to a politics that is beyond neoliberalism. Here “politics” is invoked not as mere administration but as a space of
representation, agency, and autonomy. This approach to post-neoliberalism
does not aim to correct, complete, or complement the politics of the neoliberal
era. It holds that neoliberal politics fetishizes problem solving, does not give
enough attention to building community and agency, and reduces the state to
an impotent referee. In contrast to the previous approach, this one emphasizes
the impact of globalization in reducing the autonomy of the state. Grugel and
Riggirozzi (2012: 4) refer to “an evolving attempt to develop political economies that are attuned to the social responsibilities of the state whilst remaining
responsive to the demands of ‘positioning’ national economies in a rapidly
changing global political economy.” While its relationship with neoliberalism
is contentious, post-neoliberalism still operates within a space that favors state
capitalism. Exemplary of this sort of post-neoliberal politics is a project that
leverages extraction to recover the sovereignty lost during the neoliberal era,
defend the socially and economically vulnerable and marginal, endorse a more
powerful government to rebalance power relations in society and create public
wealth (through nationalizations), and encourage social justice. As Bolivian
Vice President Álvaro García Linera explains, “the state is the main wealth
generator in the country. That wealth is not valorized as capital; it is redistributed through society through bonuses, rents, direct social benefits to the population, the freezing of utility rates and basic fuel prices, and subsidies to
agricultural production” (quoted in Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes, 2013: 83).
Third, “post-neoliberalism” may be ontological and/or ideological. Here
politics is neither about administering public goods nor about reimagining the

Spanakos and Pantoulas / CHÁVEZ AND POST-NEOLIBERALISM   41

link between state and citizen but about reconceiving the worlds that political
actors inhabit. In this view, politics institutes the process of changing politics
itself, destroys the distinction between ruler and ruled, and not only takes stewardship of public goods out of the hands of experts and places it in the hands
of the multitude (with or without institutions) but reconceives the notions of
“public” and “good.” It insists on both holding constituent assemblies and
maintaining constituent power as an open source of political legitimacy
(Azzellini and Sitrin, 2014; Negri, 2009). It reconfigures institutions and makes
the street a—perhaps the—legitimate or legitimating space of politics (Spanakos
2015). Its offers no clear economic policy prescriptions but establishes new
moral categories. Seeing politics in terms of sumak kawsay is somewhat representative of this approach in that it calls for an entirely new way of looking at
the relation between politics and place, one that must be expressed in Quechua
and can only be translated into Spanish. It offers not simply a set of policies but
a fundamentally new reality that is at odds with neoliberalism as an ontological
project. While such “anti-developmental and decolonial disputes have the least
public presence in Venezuela” they are not absent (Azzellini and Sitrin, 2014;
Escobar, 2010). They are an important part of the justification for many of the
demands of the previously “excluded” and contribute to a plastic institutionality that favors constituent power over constituted power (see Spanakos, 2013).
Finally, within “post-neoliberalism” there is neoliberalism—preference for
efficient governments, mistrust of state machinery, concern that political rents
will distort markets, interest in “getting the prices right.” In neoliberalism efficiency is understood in terms of minimizing possible costs through marketization rather than maximizing social good (see Johnson, 1982). Thus the shift
away from neoliberalism does not mean the elimination of any particular policy, framework, or mode of reasoning. Despite the remarkable popularity he
achieved during and since his second term as president, Lula da Silva’s first
term in office (if not his second) often followed neoliberal logics (Burbach, Fox,
and Fuentes, 2013; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2005). There were some noteworthy
places where his government was more progressive and supported alternatives
to neoliberalism, but his government was correctly praised by the International
Monetary Fund for its commitment to “achievable” fiscal surplus targets, and
this gained credibility for his policy-making team in the eyes of investors in
Brazil’s capital markets (see Sola, 2006; Spanakos and Renno, 2009). The longtime Brazilian activist Emir Sader (2011: 43) writes that Lula may have been a
“supreme administrator of neoliberalism.” It is significant that Lula governed
not in the 1980s or early 1990s but at the time of the World Economic Forum and
the World Social Forum. Post-neoliberalism is capable of straddling these two
worlds.
The Many Faces Of Post-Neoliberalism In Venezuela
BROADENING AND IMPROVING NEOLIBERALISM

Ever since the 1998 campaign in which an anti-neoliberal but moderately
neostructuralist and participatory agenda was favored by candidate Hugo
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Chávez, Chávez made a clear effort in rhetoric and politics to correct and tame
“savage neoliberalism.” Responding to the consequences of globalization,
Chávez explained, would require “profound changes” in the “corporate-economic world”’ such as a shift toward “the possibility of a new capitalism with
a social and environmental sensibility” (Chávez, 2005). Yet, the first Chávez
government (1999–2000) did not offer a political economic plan consistent with
its radical political discourse. Instead, it was defined more by what it opposed
(American imperialism and savage neoliberalism) than by a positive agenda
(Gott, 2008: 1356).
Buxton (2003) argues that Chávez’s policies were aimed primarily at challenging the party-centric political system of the Punto Fijo period (beginning
with the elite-pact-organized first democratic government in 1958). Rather than
conforming to a radical political economy agenda, she argues, the new administration was largely responding to the organized resistance to the new government of the main actors of puntofijismo (political actors, business, and organized
labor). Indeed, even in his inaugural speech Chávez (1999) explained, “Our
project is not statist. Neither is it extreme neoliberalism. No, we are looking for
an intermediate point, as much state as is necessary and as much market as is
possible.” Building on this vision, Chávez argued for a mixed economic model
that emphasized state activity in order to restore the “balance” between state
and market, particularly in strategic state sectors where he felt neoliberal
restructuring had gone too far (oil, mining, heavy natural resources industry,
and military high technology).
The national economic and social development plan for 2001–2007, launched
as political tensions were intensifying, offered a first break from the past but
was neither purely neoliberal nor clearly anti-neoliberal (PDESN, 2001). Rather,
it could easily be read as a Polanyian double movement correcting the perceived excesses of neoliberalism (Silva, 2009). It denounced the structural problems of the past, especially the rentist character of the economy, and proposed
developing a more productive and export-oriented one. This program involved
leveraging macroeconomic stability and fiscal prudence to procure foreign and
national investment that would diversify economic production and reintegrate
the country into the global economy (PDESN, 2001: 16–17). The state would
maintain its right to protect sectors of national industry and agriculture in the
event that they faced unfair competition and preserve its presence in the strategic sectors of the economy (13) but had to become more efficient and productive (17). Despite calls for increased production and efficiency, the plan
emphasized social justice. The basic outline was consistent with the plans promoted by the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean for
a “balance between the State and the market established by Latin American
neostructuralism . . . ‘a strategy of free market aided by the government’”
(Sunkel, 1993: 394).
Increased state spending was one of the more visible consequences of this
approach. Social spending increased as a percentage of the gross domestic
product (GDP) from 11.34 percent in 1998 to 16.7 percent in 2001 and 18.1
percent in 2004. The bulk of this increase was in public education and health,
which at their nadir in 1996 received 2.9 percent and 1.5 percent of public
investment, respectively, increasing to 6 percent and 3.2 percent by 2004. The
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increase in social spending was juxtaposed with a diminished priority on
balancing fiscal accounts, which were in deficit from 1999 until 2004 (ranging
from −1.7 percent to −4.4 percent of GDP). Underlying the increase in public
spending were two concerns: improving the conditions of Chávez’s poor base
and recovering the state’s capacity to deliver welfare to its citizens. Neither
of these goals was particularly revolutionary, and in many ways they represented a continuation of the social democratic and neostructural approaches
that were typical of Venezuelan politics for much of the second half of the
twentieth century.
As did many others in the region, Chávez understood political and economic marginality as being connected, and he felt that the state played a critical role in inclusion and incorporation. Although the Chávez governments
became more radical over time (Buxton, 2009; Ellner, 2008), neostructural
approaches persisted, among them his efforts to formalize the informal market
in 2007. The informal street vendors (buhoneros), unrepresented by Punto Fijo
politics, were natural Chávez supporters. While neoliberals saw informalsector workers as proof of the inefficiency of bloated states, Chávez’s response
was typical of neostructural and social democratic efforts to improve neoliberal systems. The 2001 development plan discussed the need to incorporate
the informal sectors into the formal sector to reduce transaction costs while
offering low tax rates and professional training to facilitate informal-sectorworker compliance (PDESN, 2001: 71). By 2007 Chávez, through an executive
decree pronounced on his weekly television show, Aló Presidente, sought to
remove street vendors from key intersections and install them in shopping
mall complexes where they would be able to sell their wares more formally.
The idea was to use the state to include groups that were seen as “excluded.”
This plan was by no means novel, and elements of formalization had been
articulated by previous politicians and governments. Setting aside the reasons
for street vendors’ resistance in 2007, what is relevant here is that the approach
of the Chávez government was consistent with efforts to fill in the gaps of
neoliberalism. This was not an anti-neoliberal strategy. Rather, Chávez was
trying to redeem capitalism by making it more inclusive. The problem was not
capitalism as much as informality, which in this case was to be resolved by
capitalism moderated by state intervention.
The inclusion of the informal vendors in the formal sector underpinned
another trend that persisted during the Chávez era: consumerism. The revolutionary rhetoric of a society based on values of social inclusion, solidarity, and
equality maintained a somewhat uneasy relation with an economy based on
imports and commerce in which market relations prevailed. By the time that
Chávez decided to include street vendors in the formal sector, trade and consumption had been increasing significantly for many consecutive years; private
final consumption expenditure reached a historic high in 2008 (BCV, 2011: 129),
indicating that more Venezuelans (and especially the poor) had access to goods
but at the same time the economy was becoming less productive and more
dependent on oil rent for imports. In this context the concern of the state was
to incorporate the street vendors into the formal sector by giving them incentives to continue operating in the commercial sector as was outlined in the
development plan.
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GOING BEYOND NEOLIBERALISM

As Grugel and Riggirozzi (2012) suggest, what is most characteristic of postneoliberalism is a form of citizenship that aims to go beyond neoliberalism’s
emphasis on “social participation” (Ellner, 2012). Perhaps most representative
of these efforts is the communal council, which first appeared in public life in
2002 as local forms of sociopolitical organization and became part of national
public administration by decree in April of 2006. The decree tied the communal
councils to the presidency but was not clear about their relations to other components of the national and municipal administration.
Although there had been a number of attempts both before and under the
Chávez governments to “democratize democracy” through greater participation
(Goldfrank, 2011), the communal councils were considered by Chávez and others
as a deliberate effort to reconfigure the geography of power in a way that would
empower a “protagonistic” democracy.3 A group of 150-400 families in urban
areas (20 in rural and 10 for Indigenous groups) needed to function as councils—
filling out paperwork, applying for recognition, setting up boards, and holding
elections—before they could be recognized and become eligible to receive state
funding. The councils were to decide on, design, and execute projects related to
the community’s organization and connect the community with the central government’s social policies (such as overseeing the local distribution of goods to
families, the creation of educational and sport facilities, and the management of
water and sewage). Their primary goal was to make citizens protagonists of their
lives by giving them the right and the mechanisms to participate directly in local
decision making and action in a very broadly conceived sphere of political and
social life. However, their participatory nature often created tensions with governmental organizations; the logic of organization between state’s representative
institutions and hierarchical bureaucracy was in clear contrast with the democratic, participatory, and horizontal logic of the councils.
The failed constitutional reform of 2007 had proposed giving “popular
power” constitutional equivalency to the municipal, state, and national governments: “The people are the depositories of sovereignty and exercise it
directly via popular power. This is not born of suffrage or any election but of
the condition of the human groups that are organized as the base of the population.” Popular power was to be organized and expressed via various different
local, social, and working councils (Wilpert, 2007). Some scholars argued that
this was consistent with the organization of power in the Paris Commune and
Marxist visions of direct democracy (Muhr, 2012).
Although more radical groups within Chavismo (which Ellner [2012] associates with anarchism) see the communal councils as spaces of authentic “constituent power,” which is contrasted with the power of the community council,
this is partially the result of central government transfers of money and recognition (see Azzellini, 2010; Ciccariello-Maher, 2013). The idea is for citizenship
to be broadened (by extension into previously depoliticized spaces) and deepened (as more citizens directly participate in actions that impact their lives).
The state is to be used to spur such citizenship, but participation is expected to
be external to the state and the elected administration.
The intention here is not to romanticize the communal councils or to suggest
that they consistently meet their goals (see García-Guadilla, 2007). Rather, it is
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only to highlight that they were designed primarily to build a robust form of local
citizenship. They do not promote an improvement or extension of neoliberal
citizenship but aim at its replacement with a more vigorous form characterized
by a broad sense of the political, deep local participation, and state intervention—
in other words, a form of citizenship that goes beyond neoliberalism.
NEW POLITICAL ONTOLOGIES

Critics and supporters alike agree that during the presidencies of Hugo
Chávez the practice and experience of politics changed significantly. This has
often been interpreted in terms of possible regime change (see Corrales and
Penfold, 2011; McCoy and Myers, 2004), but it may be more fruitful to think of
it in terms of a change in citizenship. Indeed, “one of the most important legacies of Chávez may be that the new form of citizenship he promotes shapes
how citizenship is understood within Venezuela and other countries in the
decades to come” (Spanakos, 2008: 522). The protagonistic citizenship he envisioned was repeatedly expressed as a response to the neoliberal citizenship of
the Fourth Republic.4 Whereas neoliberal citizenship has been characterized by
tendencies to see citizenship in terms of voluntarism, political but not economic/social rights, and individualism and consumption (see Lechner, 2007;
Yashar, 2007), under Chávez both opposition and supporters began to think of
citizenship differently. This was not simply a matter of improving neoliberalism or replacing it with a more developmentalist, state-centered citizenship but
a wholesale effort to see the citizen and politics in a new way.
As Fernandes (2010) notes, the Bolivarian project has always involved not
just political and economic but also cultural components. Rather than simply a
matter of facilitating inclusion for certain groups (Afro-Venezuelans, indigenous groups, women) it has been part of a broader effort to build a new citizenship. Chávez’s constant invocation of history “from the perspective of the social
and popular movements,” a collection of struggles with protagonists explicitly
identified as heroic, is illustrative of this (Rein, 2012: 295). The effort to include
the struggle of previously marginal citizens in history gives a central normative
role to street politics and the struggle against powerful interests. While this
clearly serves as a means of encouraging sympathy among the underrepresented, it is part of a broader project to (re)politicize citizenship. Indeed,
whether in mass marches in public squares or in constant discussion of politics,
since Chávez’s first electoral victory in 1998 Venezuelans have thought of citizenship as an activity from which one could not withdraw. Citizenship necessitated making political choices—even if it was to be neither Chavista nor
opposition—and had consequences that were not limited to the political realm
narrowly construed.
The emphasis on activity relies on a fundamental reshaping of the prevailing
notion of citizenship. Whereas an effort to deepen or correct neoliberal citizenship might be characterized by programs to complement market forces or to
involve the state more directly in citizenship-enabling practices (such as
improved law enforcement and the addition of ombudsmen), Chávez’s legacy
is not limited to such ideas. It is more confrontational with than complementary to previous modes of citizenship. Between 1986 and 1998 public figures
privileged technical expertise in public affairs, and between 1958 and 1994
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(possibly 1998) decision making was primarily produced by and within parties
and then communicated publicly. After 1999, political communication and
decision making became more “public” in that they involved more people,
more public places, and more popular language and reasoning. Of course,
many decisions were top-down, but what was remarkable was that the “street,”
the public plaza, and many other places were dominated by political discussion
and organizing—that people normally alienated from politics felt that they had
become agents (Spanakos, 2008).
In addition to the framing of politics largely by technically trained experts,
neoliberal citizenship relied on rights that were invoked only when they were
challenged. Under the assumption of universal applicability of legal status,
neoliberal citizenship assumes that the state need only defend the rights of
citizens, rights that are contained in constitutional and legal statutes. For
Chávez, citizenship relied upon not only struggle but also regular invocations
of the existence of rights by people who felt that their rights were constrained.
Personal testimony of the way a previous government (and periodically a
poorly managed Chavista agency or municipality) had abused such rights was
a recurring theme in Aló Presidente and other pro-Bolivarian productions. Here
citizenship involved not invoking rights when they were threatened but
reminding the public of past violations of rights whose existence could not be
guaranteed solely by constitutional decree. Remembering past restrictions on
citizenship became fundamental to citizenship’s politicization. For all the comical portrayals of Aló Presidente, Chávez’s occupation of the airwaves on
Sundays, his constant travels throughout the country, and the popular language he used made politics unavoidable. Respondents asked whether and
how often they spoke of politics generally laughed before replying, “All the
time” or “Is there anything else?”, this sense that politics is “all” or at least
always present a decade and a half later was largely shared by those who supported and those who opposed Chávez as well as those who identified themselves as neither.
In that sense politics is not a vocation for some or a lifestyle chosen but part
of life for everyone. One may decline to participate, militate, or even discuss, but
one cannot avoid the participation, demonstrations, or discussions of others. As
one teacher in Barquisimeto (quoted in Spanakos, 2008: 528) expressed it,
The process has affected the ordinary citizen. Never before has there been so
much protagonism in the political process. Here the people were mute; they
voted and went home. . . . Now you are not only an observer of politics, you
are participating in politics. . . . Now [the people] think, “I am a protagonist in
my own process.”

Members of the opposition expressed similar sentiments. Indeed, virtually
all the subjects interviewed—regardless of political preference, education,
class, or any other marker—responded that they talked about politics “all the
time” or “daily.”
In addition to politics’s attaching itself to the way the Venezuelans not only
practice citizenship but understand their lives, citizenship has taken on new
spatial dimensions. Although the Chávez governments have been heavily critiqued for their vague desire to change the geography of power, for their efforts
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at decentralization, and for their relationship with institutions more broadly
(see Corrales and Penfold, 2011; Goldfrank, 2011), the area of politics has
changed in very visible ways. Caracas and other urban areas contain countless
formally and informally commissioned political murals and graffiti. The citizen
who walks through the city cannot avoid politicizing messages. Similarly, the
missions set up offices that are designed to be spaces for both the community
and the government, not simply neutral state institutions. During one event in
which many governmental services were offered to residents in Petare, a government official interviewed at a Barrio Adentro mission said proudly, “Now
the institutions are in the street” (quoted in Spanakos, 2008: 528). This commonly expressed refrain is representative of a new way of seeing the geography
of the city, one in which the political and the state are present and the citizen
has the right and the obligation to contribute to both. This is not an improved
neoliberal citizen or simply a return to a more state-centric matrix but an effort
(not without problems and contradictions, of course) to develop something
new and distinct.
THE PERSISTENCE OF NEOLIBERAL THINKING

Finally, post-neoliberalism coexists with politics and thought associated with
neoliberalism. Fernandes (2010: 25) is especially keen in detecting this, examining the “complex dynamics of power and contestation as urban social movements clash with the instrumental rationalities of the post-neoliberal state” and
finding a surprising presence of what she calls neoliberal governmentality in
Bolivarian Venezuela. Indeed, her book identifies a recurring struggle between
social movements, with their “place-based consciousness, historical memory,
and oral narrative to justify claims over public space and access to resources,”
and administrators “who deploy instrumental and qualitative approaches in
their management of community-based programs and organizations” (233).
That both supported Chávez, for Fernandes, was a sign not only of plurality
within the movement but of the persistence of neoliberal rationality in governmental administration even when it was controlled by anti-neoliberal politicians. Although supporters write off administrative conservativism as a
reactionary bureaucratic response of the “internal opposition” or of people not
yet on board with twenty-first-century socialism, and critics see this as proof
that beyond the smoke, mirrors, and rhetoric not much has changed, neoliberal
governmentality is still important in Bolivarian Venezuela. This should not
come as a surprise, given the “stickiness” of the institutional patterns that constrain otherwise apparently significant and transformative political developments (see Skocpol and Pierson, 2002; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992).
Early in his first administration, President Chávez surprised many observers
by adopting a relatively moderate, if not careful, macroeconomic approach,
retaining for a short period the finance minister appointed by the previous
president, Rafael Caldera, Maritza Izaguirre. Although this was strategic
behavior, moderating in the area of macroeconomics while posing a more radical political agenda (in the form of a constituent assembly and broad enabling
powers), and the planned privatizations were eventually abandoned, it fit
within neoliberal assumptions about policy constraints and tradeoffs in a tough
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moment for Venezuelan crude oil prices. Deputy Finance Minister Jesús
Bermúdez (2002) demonstrated the acceptance of neoliberalism when there
was “no alternative,” explaining:
We hope to control this [economy’s contraction] with a privatization and concessions plan that has already begun. PDVSA has started by offering gas concessions to investors. PDVSA will have to take a 51 percent share in the first
concession, but in the following ones the private investors can take 100 percent
shares, and this includes foreign companies, which are likely to be the main
investors.

The declarations of Bermúdez (who was later accused of corruption) were
representative neither of all supporters nor of all members of the government
in 2002, but that is precisely the point. Within a broad post-neoliberal coalition,
particularly in moments of crisis, actors inside the government returned to a
neoliberal toolkit to resolve recurrent problems. Despite the president’s declaration of the death of neoliberalism, it survived in actors that occupied some
important positions in his governments.
The high-profile spending on missions and other sociopolitically oriented
projects did not truly take off until after the failed coup in 2002 and the oil strike
in 2003 and also, critically, after petroleum prices (globally) had opened up
spaces for policy autonomy (see Weyland, 2011). Despite the immediate damage to key supporters and challenges for redistribution, the Chávez government also oversaw devaluations of the bolivar at moments in which “there was
no alternative,” an expression associated with neoliberal governmentality that
presents the rationality of the speaker as the only one that is viable (see Panizza
and Philip, 2013).
Whereas the constraints imposed by material conditions (say, petroleum
prices) might be explained by something other than neoliberal administrative
techniques, it is harder to argue this for political matters. One of the repeated
demands of Chavismo has been for a more participatory democracy, and critics
have found the government inconsistent, particularly over time, on this matter
(see Goldfrank, 2011; López and Lander, 2011). Fernandes (2010) notes that
while the Bolivarian governments have increased cultural funding, actively
supported public and community media, recognized marginalized sectors of
society, and critiqued neoliberalism (all elements of a broad post-neoliberal
agenda), they continue to employ neoliberal governmentality even in the
administration of anti-neoliberal programs. The community councils are seen
as a fundamental space for the transformation of geographies of power and for
establishing constituent power among the people, but they require government
recognition, which means responding to logics that activists often consider
bureaucratic, managerialist, and neoliberal.
For many of the people of the base who believe that movement politics are
at the root of the Bolivarian Revolution (“We created Chávez,” in the words of
one of Ciccariello-Maher’s [2013] informants), the idea of boards is antithetical
to the more organic assemblies that characterize their politics. Indeed, longterm neighborhood-association activists often find the structure of community
councils yet another top-down state form that limits their autonomy and democratic potential. Similarly, state agencies and officials often have predetermined
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views on issues that contradict the views of the communities, such as the case
of cultural production during the Bolivarian Revolution (Fernandes, 2010: 144–
148). In many cases, people see their decision-making processes as revolutionary, plastic, creative, and in constant confrontation with state agents who are
arteriosclerotic, conservative, and neoliberal.
Fernandes discusses a typical case in which a middle-class government official met with community activists to discuss cultural production. Although the
government view was that culture was locally produced by “the people,” the
facilitator, having divided the activists into groups and heard the reports of
each, framed their comments in a pre-packaged notion of cultural production.
It was as though culture produced by the people were the result of a mandate
from above rather than a response to activity from below. More troubling still
was that recognition of the producers required meeting the requirements of the
administration (a board of directors, etc). The irony of the organic production
of revolutionary art’s being stymied by the same government that praises it is
significant.
The concern about survivals of neoliberalism among political activists within
Bolivarianism has been accentuated since the death of Chávez. Many activists
at the base level fear that the post-Chávez PSUV and government leadership
are moving toward greater centralization and institutionalization—that they
are returning politics to the technically trained bureaucrats and elected officials. This means a decided movement against the creative and more free-flowing politics of the street (post-neoliberalism as ontological project), and this has
important implications for the legitimacy that key support groups accord the
government. In August of 2013, the candidates for the PSUV municipal elections were announced. Dario Azzellini (2013), a longtime follower of base politics in Venezuela, writes, “They were not elected by the bases. They were
named by Maduro and his buddies in the PSUV. Nefarious practice. Serious
mistake.” Considering that the PSUV is a political party that has trumpeted its
use of primaries to choose candidates, this was a very serious reversal, one that
many at the base feel is an indication that the government is being taken over
by more conservative interests.
Conclusion
Neoliberalism has been a somewhat elusive target. Even when it was most
influential in Latin America, it was never a single thing (it was always easier to
classify as a whole only in opposition [Peck, Theodore, and Brenner, 2012]).
Now that neoliberalism may seem wholly discredited (Bresser-Pereira, 2013)
and almost a decade after the Pink Tide in Latin America, it is an opportune
moment to think about what postneoliberalism is and what is “post-” about it.
The legacy of one of Latin America’s most strident anti-neoliberals, Hugo
Chávez, provides a valuable opportunity to do that. Analyzing post-neoliberalism during and following the presidencies of Hugo Chávez confirms what
careful observers have noted: that anti-neoliberal movements are clearer about
what they oppose than about what they propose (Coronil, 2011; Lomnitz, 2006).
This paper has tried to clarify post-neoliberalism as a semantic space via a
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typology that makes visible various overlapping and at times contradictory
tendencies in post-neoliberal Venezuela. This may help scholars, practitioners,
and citizens better appreciate the legacy of Hugo Chávez, who is too often
identified as the Chávez of a particular group—supporters, opponents, activists, ministers, sympathetic/critical scholars, and so on. It may also provide
insight into the way scholars appraise other, less high-profile efforts to construct a post-neoliberal politics.
Notes
1. Although, as Buxton (2009) notes, many of the policies of the first Chávez government were
not especially anti-neoliberal, his campaign and rhetoric were (see Gates, 2010).
2. This may include neodevelopmentalists and neostructuralists who give considerable weight
to fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability.
3. The fourth motor of the revolution out of five, as set out in 2007—the others being the
enabling law, the constitutional reform, an educational campaign called Morales y Luces (Lights
and Morals), and the explosion of communal power.
4. Chávez’s rhetorical characterization and periodization of Venezuelan political systems
helped distinguish a project of citizenship (and democracy) that he saw as going beyond that of
the previous regime.
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